Anti-Semitism

MUSLIM ANTI-SEMITISMThe Challenge and Possible Responses
The Muslim world’s hostility towards Israel and the Jewish People has intensified in
the last quarter century. This hostility, which some have called ‘Muslim anti-Semitism,’
is even prevalent in Egypt and Jordan, both of which have signed peace agreements
with Israel. Among the mega-trends affecting the world at large, including Israel
and the Jewish People, the rise in the power of radical Islam has a substantial global
impact. Fears with respect to the rising power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
and Egypt are forcing these regimes to navigate constantly between the considerations
of their own survivability and stability and maintaining peace with Israel. We are
thus witnessing various manifestations of leniency towards the pressures of Islamic
opposition.
This phenomenon is not limited to countries that have reached agreements with
Israel; rather, it is widespread, encompassing the entire Sunni and Shiite Arab world, as
well as Islamic nations in the East.
The phenomenon of Jew hatred in the Muslim world and its dangers are the focus
of Prof. Sivan’s study. His historical analysis exposes the ancient roots of this hatred,
tracing them to the modern age of the 19th and 20th centuries, when Muslim-Christian
relations deteriorated, first as a result of the occupation of some Maghreb countries
(North Africa) by Christian powers, and later, with the expansion of European
colonialism throughout the Arab and Muslim realm.
Certainly, the main catalyst for the increase in Israel hatred is the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, which has intensified the waves of hostility, from the agitation by the Mufti
of Jerusalem in the 1920s, through the Arab Revolt, the establishment of the State of
Israel, to the stinging defeat in the Six Day War. All of these have engendered a deep
frustration in the Arab world, which has translated into burning animosity towards
Israel and the Jewish People as a whole. This animosity has spilled over beyond the
boundaries of Arab Islam and reached far into Islamic countries outside the region,
which have taken the lead in highlighting the cultural-religious-political ugliness
attributed to the Jews and Israel, their subversion and treachery, portrayed as innately
Jewish by nature, ever since the days of the Prophet Muhammad. This hatred has
found expression, among other things, in Holocaust denial and in accusing the Jews
of exaggerating its scale, or even fabricating it altogether, in order to justify their
conquering territory that is an Arab endowment.
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Professor Sivan’s persuasive argumentation leads him to a number of important
conclusions and recommendations. The first of these concerns the need to focus
on the anti-Semitism that is manufactured and promulgated mainly by the Muslim
Brotherhood and other organizations of its ilk, the Saudi regime and the Shiite regime
in Iran. It follows that the primary endeavor to address and diminish the intensity of
the hatred should be directed towards each specific manifestation which takes on
unique dimensions in various countries. Unlike the Al-Qaeda organization, this is
not a global phenomenon. Anti-Semitism and hatred are ‘national’ in character, and
their containment must be achieved by focusing on each host-nation according to its
specific conditions and characteristics.
The second recommendation derives from the first, and focuses on the need to
reduce the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East, the Maghreb
and Europe. Along with its franchises, such as Hamas, the movement has managed to
thrive and increase its influence, especially within the Palestinian Authority during the
two Intifadas and with Hamas’ rise to supremacy in the Gaza Strip.
Underlining the need to deepen our understanding of adversaries and enemies and
the application of proven, reliable and relevant information in a systematic and nonsporadic
manner could bring about a more effective management of the struggle
against anti-Semitism. This recommendation also includes supporting ‘interfaith
dialogue’ which may be effective due to the broad theological common ground
shared by believers of Islam and Judaism. Within this dialogue, a concerted effort must
be made to eradicate negative stereotypes of Muslims held by Jews, and of Jews held
by Muslims. The September 2001 terror attacks, which have pushed many moderate
Muslims into a tight corner, could serve as a common ground for understanding the
plight of any stigmatized group.
Prof. Sivan’s extensive knowledge, expertise and close familiarity with Islamic tradition,
as well as his thorough understanding of the effects of the Israeli-Arab conflict, have
joined to created the basic infrastructure so vital to formulating recommendations
for action and response vis-à-vis Islamic extremism, which finds expression in
promoting and escalating Jew-hatred for the purpose of attaining other goals. Prof.
Sivan’s recommendations provide a sound and rational basis for action to decrease
hostility towards and hatred of Israel and the Jewish People.
Aharon Zeevi Farkash
President of the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute
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INTRODUCTION
This position paper seeks to describe and analyze the phenomenon of hatred against
Jews in the Muslim world, note the dangers it embodies, and suggest courses of action
for its thwarting and/or alleviation. The work discusses:
1. The legacy of the near and far Islamic past, its empirical presence, its present
usages, as well as the influence of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the current Muslim
revival.
2. Cultural dialogue as a potential factor in reducing hostility and hatred.
3. Assuming that such dialogue is of limited importance, we examine the deep
meanings of Jew hatred, which are critical for any informed strategy to counter the
phenomenon.
4. Based on all of the above, we propose possible responses.
In the external environment of the Jewish People, the world of Islam is a prominent
force. Although it is based on a monotheistic faith that is similar in many respects
to Judaism (e.g., the supremacy of Scripture and of the Law), it is currently hostile to
Judaism. Such hostility is often dampened down by the geo-strategic considerations
of decision makers in the Muslim world (such as peace agreements, or common
interests shared by Sunni Muslims and Jews against Iran and the Shia). This hostility is
fueled to a large degree by a surge of hate that has surfaced in the last quarter century,
and is referred to by the media as “Muslim anti-Semitism”.
Essentially this wave is a cultural-political phenomenon affecting the “political public”
in Islamic countries, that is, that segment of the public that is interested in political
issues, whose portion of the general population is usually estimated at 10-15 percent,
comprising mostly city-dwelling/urban men. The “political public” includes many
active supporters of the incumbent regime and its clients, or followers/cronies (Khodi
in Iran), as well as active opposition forces, their leaders and grassroots activists. The
top echelons of the political elites (with the exception of Iran and perhaps Saudi
Arabia) are not anti-Semitic, unlike the situation in the 1960s, and do not conduct
intensive anti-Semitic propaganda. Muslim regimes are on the whole authoritarian,
but they are preoccupied by their own survival and not by the question of Palestine
or by the “plots of world Jewry.” Today, many of them are so worried by the threat
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posed by Iran and emergent Shiism they carry out covert or overt cooperation with
Israel – “the enemy of my enemy… Decision- makers are motivated mostly by regime
survival and geo-strategic considerations (which often tends to diminish the hate,
as mentioned above, turning it into latent hostility). Yet these regimes’ margin of
maneuver is also constrained by the currents flowing within the “political public” and
its spiritual and communal leaders, which is more or less equivalent to the public of
newspaper readers, radio listeners, TV news viewers and Internet surfers, i.e., people
who customarily discuss among themselves the meaning of the content offered to
them by the media. Within this public, there are various prisms for making sense of
reality, and such prisms have a certain cultural depth. By their very nature, prisms
also define what is “inconceivable” and who is “abominable.” Unfortunately, Judaism
and the Jews have recently become such “abominations”, so that peace or even “coexistence”
with them tends to be perceived as “inconceivable” among significant
segments of the political public, including the establishment. This situation would
be further exacerbated if radical Islamist forces obtain hegemony, or even power, as
has already happened in Iran, Afghanistan and the Sudan, or if the regime’s ideology
partly overlaps that of the Islamic fanatics (as in Saudi Arabia). In a country like Syria,
for instance, the fact that a sweeping Islamization process is taking place within civil
society constrains the maneuverability of the regime (which is inherently secular) in
terms of concessions towards peace with Israel and/or the nature of relations with
Israel after signing a peace agreement.
It must be said, however, that the two regimes that have signed peace agreements
with Israel – Egypt and Jordan – have managed so far to maneuver nicely between
geo-strategic considerations and responding (mostly on a symbolic and declarative
level) to the pressures of Islamic opposition, especially in an era when the Iranian
threat is foremost on their agenda. Jordan, for example, ordered its ambassador in
Tel-Aviv to return home during Operation Cast Lead, but reinstated him shortly
after. Egypt refrained from doing even that, and instead has fortified its position as
a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians and tried to block the Rafah crossing,
while the official media showered sympathy on the Gazans and sharp criticism on
Israel. Saudi Arabia too has limited itself to declarations, without impeding its tacit
cooperation with Israel as part of the ‘Pragmatic Alliance’ against Iran.
In North Africa, the societal hatred of Jews has circumscribed the nature of any
relationship which could be developed with the regimes in Tunisia and Morocco, and the
same is true for South-Eastern Asian countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia.
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As far as the state of Israel is concerned, therefore, hatred of Jews has an effect far
beyond its role in mobilizing the Palestinian (and other) masses for the struggle
against Israel among those active elements that are hostile to the status quo, such
as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. In addition, it bears further significance in relation to
the Jewish Diaspora, especially in Western Europe, where it is a disturbing, hostile
and sometimes violent element, especially on a communal-local level. However, the
gravity of this factor varies between different countries, and is a matter of situational
and not core consciousness. The gravest case, as described below, is the French one,
but even in France, Muslim hatred of Jews does not constitute a critical barrier to the
integration of Jews in French society. It seems that the constraints produced by Jew
hatred on Israel’s integration in our region are far more serious.
In human existence, to speak “of cultural depth” – i.e., a connection to the sphere
where a community determines meanings and judges and evaluates its friends and
foes (following Robert Bellah’s famous definition) – implies, in the Islamic context,
a connection to the past. And indeed, the historical relationship between Muslims
and Jews carries weight and influence on thought patterns in these prisms of seeing.
This refers both to objective-empirical influence, not necessarily on a conscious level,
to still vivid historical memories (for instance, the brutal encounter between the
prophet Muhammad and the Jews of the Arabian Peninsula), to relationship patterns
of ancient times (the Jews as ‘protected dependents’ or as members of “the Angry
Faith”), as well as the deliberate manipulation of these memories and patterns by
political and cultural elites today.
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CHAPTER 1: FINDINGS
1. Like modern European anti-Semitism, modern Muslim hatred of Jews is, as its
name suggests, modern – that is, a product of the 19th and 20th centuries, built upon
medieval historical foundations but with totally different add-ons and qualities.
Hatred of Jews in Islam is the outcome of the encounter between two monotheistic
religions, first in the Arabian Peninsula and later throughout the Middle East and
North Africa, as they were conquered by the Arabs. The encounter in the Arab
Peninsula is the result of historical coincidence: although Muhammad, the prophet
of Islam, drew some of his gospel from the two preceding monotheistic religions, and
acknowledged his debt to Moses and Jesus, he only had flesh-and-blood encounters
with Jews, who were the only monotheists living in the Arabian Peninsula at the time,
mostly in Medina. Upon his immigration-escape (Hijra, 622 CE) from his hometown,
Mecca, where he was persecuted, into Medina, he was called upon to serve as arbiter
and ruler and tried to build an alliance with the three Jewish tribes residing in Medina.
As a basis for accepting his rule, he offered certain observance concessions (facing the
direction of Jerusalem in prayer, Sabbath as the day of rest, the Day of Atonement
as a day of fasting), and this cooperation worked properly for about a year and half,
until it fell apart. About the reasons for the collapse we only have the Muslim version
– the Jews forfeited their obligations (the Jewish tribes, having been defeated in the
armed conflict, did not leave behind a version of their own). The violent clashes
ended in victory for the Muslims, the deportation of two of the Jewish tribes from
the Peninsula, and the killing of all males from the third tribe, selling its women and
children off into slavery. From this point and until the death of the Prophet (632),
the Jewish residents of Arabia were defined as enemies of Islam, just as the pagan
infidels of Mecca. And indeed, the chapters of the Quran revealed in Medina are
rife with polemical verses aimed at both these enemies. In stylistic terms, the vitriol
hurled at the Jews is much more venomous than against the Christians, with whom
the polemic had been merely theoretical (concerning the Trinity, the Incarnation of
the Son of God, etc.), and also targets their alleged attributes as a community. Among
these, the most prominent is treachery, along with clannishness and divisiveness (as
illustrated by the story of Korah, retold in the Quran). Moreover, the Jews are to be
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overly strict in their observance, unlike Islam, which according to the Prophet is a
tolerant and lenient religion, “the religion of the middle,” which does not demand too
much exertion from its believers. The Jews, on the contrary, are fanatical and angry.
This being the constitutive period of the Muslim faith, these words and events carry a
traumatic significance, with great future repercussions, stemming from Muhammad’s
alleged adage: “All the Jews are inevitably similar to their Arabian Peninsula brethren.”
The second encounter between Jews and Islam took place in the lands occupied by the
Muslims, where Jews have been a small minority within the vanquished populations,
in which most monotheists were Christians. The main Muslim proselytizing thrust
(using incentives, persuasion and coercion) was directed at the Christians, and of
course the main enemies of Islam outside its realms were also Christians, i.e. the
Byzantine Empire. No wonder, therefore, that the primary theological polemic in
Islam was directed against Christianity (as in the 1398 debate, recently cited by Pope
Benedict XVI in his Regensburg Lecture). Nevertheless, a considerable part of Muslim
polemics (both oral and written) was targeted at the Jews, because Islam remained
loyal to the perception that Judaism was a worthy and important contender, being
a monotheistic religion which preceded and contributed to Islam, yet its rabbis,
according to Islam, have distorted the Gospel of Moses, just as the Church distorted
the Gospel of Jesus. Hence, one should attempt to convert them all.
Thus the encounter in the conquered lands had a negative historical background, that
is the clash in Medina, but a positive theological foundation as well. This combination
engendered a concept which affected the legal status of the Jews in Islamic countries.
Unlike heathens, they were not faced with the choice of “Islam or the sword,” and
their status was comparable to that of Christians as “protected” (ahl al-dhimma),
who enjoy protection by public law (and not by privilege, as in the West) of their
life, limb and property; are allowed to observe the customs of their religion, though
not in public, but forbidden to propagate their faith (capital punishment for anyone
attempting to convert a Muslim), or build synagogues of heights exceeding that of
neighboring mosques. Their status as second-rate citizens is asserted by a special tax
(jizya) and a ban against their occupying high-ranking positions in the administration,
judiciary and military.
Despite all the restrictions, it is clear that the Jews in Islam are not condemned to
the primarily negative theological and legal standing they have in Christianity: The
betrayal of Muhammad by a few tribes is nowhere near the murder of the son of God.
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The protection by state law puts them in a much safer position than the one they had
in medieval Europe, despite the theological arguments against Judaism as an “angry
and pedantic religion,” contrary to Islam, which claims to uphold “the golden way,”
“the middle road,” and a “live and let live” philosophy. The theological polemic with
Christianity was far more serious, as Christianity was also an incomparably greater
political and military enemy, from the days of Byzantium to modern colonialism.
In terms of beliefs and attitudes, the picture is largely similar: there has been disdain
tinged with hostility, but not outright hatred against the Jews, and the hostility is not
the kind that exists between two equal parties (or almost equal, as the Muslims would
regard the Christians in the days of the Crusades and the Reconquista), but between
superiors and inferiors. In other words, contempt and humiliation – but not hate. In
pre-colonial Morocco the Jews were called “the lowest of the low” (asfal al-safalin). In
accounts by Muslim travelers, the Jews are usually depicted as subordinate, silent and
sword-less to defend themselves. And yet pogroms were rare in the history of Islam,
as were forced collective conversions (except in Morocco and Yemen in medieval
times and in Iran in the late 18th century). A key means of humiliation is ridicule. And
indeed, instances in which the Jews are depicted in ridiculous situations are recurring
in the special hadith collections known as Isra’iliyyat. Ridicule is moreover mixed
with the constant mention of the Jews’ plotting against the Prophet Muhammad in
Medina. It is no coincidence that in Egyptian and Persian films depicting the days of
the Prophet Muhammad, the Jews have an invariably high-pitched and squeaky voice –
a proven device for provoking ridicule.
In return for payment to the rulers and officials, Jews could obtain accommodations
in terms of status, such as relaxation of the ban on riding horses, wearing a tag on
their hats (usually yellow), etc. The more self-confident the Muslims were, the more
they tended to relax their laws and prohibitions; and vice versa, in times of defeat and
retreat, the restrictions were aggravated. But in general, we are talking here about a
medieval brand of tolerance, granted by a ruling group to a subordinate group, where
the ruling religion is a priori considered as theologically superior and the subordinate
group has a lower, though still legitimate status in terms of its theological essence. It
is therefore a problematic, but not tragic, background for the developments in the
modern era.On the popular culture level, there were many common cults (such as cults of the
saints) shared by Jews and Muslims, around the tombs of sheikhs and rabbis, virtuous
individuals or mythological figures from their shared past (Prophet Elijah). There is
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also evidence of social relations. A prominent exception is Iran, where, under the
influence of Zoroastrian traditions, the Jews were considered physically impure and
untouchable (najasa). Jews were also prohibited from inheriting from Shiites, whereas
the opposite was allowed. A Jew who converted to Islam was entitled to the entire
inheritance. Shiites were not allowed to marry Jewish women, except for in temporary
marriage (mut’a), which is an inferior and exploitative type of concubinage.
None of this leads from a complex state of affairs in a deterministic fashion into the
new Muslim anti-Semitism. The new anti-Semitism is the product of the encounter
with the West in the 19th-20th centuries and the Israeli-Arab conflict. The medieval
state of affairs may have provided some (but not all) of the building-blocks for the
new phenomenon and part of its architecture (but again, not all of it, and certainly
not its general features).
2. In the 19th century, during the early transition to the modern era in the world of
Islam, a deterioration process occurred in the Muslim-Christian relationship. Parts
of the Islamic world (Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia) were conquered by Christian powers,
leading to the loss of self-confidence of the Muslim world regarding its sense of
inherent supremacy – ideological, political and military – upon which its policy
of tolerance of the ahl al-dhimma (the majority of whom being Christians) was
based. Christian European powers, such as France, Britain and Russia, also enjoyed
“capitulations” – ex-territorial rights which provided their subjects residing in the
East ex-territorial jurisprudence rights through their respective consulates, in effect
exempting entire Christians communities, mainly in the major cities of trade, from the
jurisprudence of Sharia, the prevailing legal system based on ancient Muslim religious
law. Many Christians also experienced an improvement in their socio-economic status
through serving as commercial agents of European interests making headway into the
Middle East and the Maghreb. The many tensions created as a result of this inversion
of the status of the “protected” did not concern the Jews, because they only enjoyed
the “Capitulations” as individuals, and not as a collectivity, and did not secure a special
position in the service of foreign powers. (The one exception was Algeria where all
Jews were granted French citizenship in 1870.) But the very sensitivity of the Muslim
establishment towards the infringement of the dhimma status has often resulted in
a stricter application of the rules, certainly with respect to Jews who did not benefit
from foreign protection.
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The very contact with the West in itself brought about several negative shifts in
the status of the Jews. Through the Catholic Church and its missionary system, the
notion of the Blood Libel, which sipped into consciousness following the Damascus
Blood Libel (1840) became widespread and incorporated into the traditional image
of the Jews’ scheming nature. Catholicism also helped propagate the notion about
a global conspiracy linking the Freemasons and the Jews, while Russian Churches and
their Greek-Orthodox extensions helped spread the Protocols of the Elders of Zion
towards the end of the 19th century, which were supposed to “explain” the advancing
globalization of late 19th-early 20th century as a Jewish plot to rule the world. Here too,
a traditional narrative about the inherent treachery of the Jews has been augmented
and upgraded by new information, updated to suit the times. While the blood libels
and Protocols had no immediate negative consequences, they were bound to appear
in strength in the long run.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that in the 19th century the Jews’ status significantly
deteriorated. A lot of the traditional Muslim tolerance remained intact, which was
evident in the Dreyfus Affair, when a number of Muslim leading thinkers, including
Rashid Rida (a Syrian reformer living in Egypt, who was in fact a spiritual forefather of
the Muslim Brotherhood), defended Dreyfus’s innocence. If something can be learned
from the affair, Rida and others argued, it is the essential hypocrisy of Western culture,
including the ‘enlightened’ France: This culture may uphold freedom of expression
and equality for all in theory, but in practice, it discriminates against oppressed
minorities.
3. The main catalyst for the transformation of Jew-hatred was the Zionist-Arab
conflict, which burst into consciousness with the Balfour Declaration and resulted in
a grave violent confrontation during the 1929 riots in Palestine. This transformation
involved a change of image, necessitated by the circumstances. The Jews, who were
hither to perceived as “children of death” (awlad almawt), cowards, unmanly and
subordinate, proved their ability to use violence, raise international support in the
Christian world (which until then seemed to be interested only in local Christians),
all this in an unexpected colonial effort focused on a Muslim country saturated with
historical memories.
Islamic journalism has often covered the subject in the 1920s and 1930s, but as a result
of the formidable events the Islamic world had undergone – the fall of the Ottoman
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Empire, the abolition of the Caliphate, the establishment of the new states. The issue
of Palestine did not have much salience beyond the circle of Al-Sham (Greater Syria),
the Ottoman administrative unit of which Palestine had been a part until the end of
WWI. Ultimately, the Palestinians were still alone in the battlefield, and they are the
ones who brought about the change in the image of the Jews.
It was the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, who emphasized since the late
‘20s the eventual occupation of Jerusalem by the Jews as a pan-Islamic threat, a kind of
revival of the Crusades in order to build the Third Temple – a drama acted out most
violently in the 1929 riots. Palestinian educator Izzat al-Darwa detected in biblical
times the Jewish obsession with the conquest of the land, stressed the cruelty the
Israelites employed to fight against the Canaanite peoples that inhabited the land.
These very Canaanites, he argued, were the forebears of the Palestinians. Biblical
brutality accounted for their success in using violence then and now. And the resulting
arrogance (ghatrasa) marked the Jewish attitude as “the Chosen People” towards
anyone outside the fold. When inferiors become superiors in Palestine, it is because
the heretofore down-trodden Jews, driven by their immanent sense of superiority,
are revealing their true nature. Drawsa and others dug and found in the hadith (the
oral tradition of Islam) the genre of Isra’iliyyat (Chronicles of the Jews), which is full
of fables and legends of Jewish origin, biblical feats, as well as alleged attempts of
Jewish converts to Islam (such as Kaab al-Achbar) to introduce Jewish concepts into
their newly adopted religion. In this context they found fertile ground for their plots.
They augmented this historical background with the stories of the Protocols, the
Freemasons and the legend of the Rothschilds, all of which served to explain how a
“religion dispersed to the ends of the earth like specks of dust” could consolidate such
extensive international backing for its malevolent schemes.
The issue of Jerusalem played an important role in mobilizing the Palestinian
villages into a national consciousness of struggle against the Jews, which hitherto
appealed only to town-dwellers, but its impact outside the mandatory borders
was inconsequential, despite the Pan-Islamic Congress which convened in defense
of Jerusalem (1931). The same is true for other elements of the “Judeo-Masonic
Conspiracy” which was purported to overtake “the sacred endowments of Islam and
its holy land.” Even among the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt this was seen more as
a pedagogical tool, or, as their founder, Hassan al-Banna, said, “both a mihna [trial,
ordeal] and a manha [gift],” meaning that it only goes to show how low Islam had sunk
because of the sins of its believers. Still, there was no burning animosity that would
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eliminate any sense of common humanity and link to universal values. During 1944-
1947, most of the Egyptian press expressed shock and horror at the unfolding story of
the death camps, although it largely regarded it as further proof of the degeneration
of Western culture. This position of the Egyptians was distinctly different from that
expressed in the Palestinian press, which, while not denying the Holocaust, dedicated
much less space to it, mainly voicing fears of the Zionists’ sophisticated utilization of
their brethren’s catastrophe to advance their takeover of Palestine.
4. The ‘big bang’ came in 1948: Islamic territory fell to the hands of Jewish infidels;
most of the population fled or was driven out; four Arab armies suffered defeat at
the hands of an enemy that had seemed so tiny and weak. This was a turning point of
historic proportions – Jews fighting Muslims and winning – and a cognitive dissonance
followed. In order to explain away that dissonance, a conspiratorial explanation was
needed: It was the aid of closely intertwined powers (in the spirit of the Protocols of
the Elders of Zion), and the use of military or diplomatic deception, a reincarnation of
the treachery theory from the days of Muhammad back in Medina.
The rise in anti-Semitism was immediately manifested in the mounting social isolation
of the Jews in Arab countries, several waves of pogroms and deportation (in Iraq,
Yemen, and later Egypt). Thus ancient and modern-day elements were blended into
a new formation, focused on the “Zionist entity” and its allies, Jews around the world.
What up until then had mostly been contempt was replaced by a hatred that was as
enormous as the catastrophe itself (nakba – as the defeat in the war over Palestine
was named), and served as an acid test for the faults and weaknesses of Arab societies
as a whole, as it also did in 1967. Thus, the traditional sense of contempt turned into a
sense of deep humiliation, mixed with the loss of self-confidence.
The pan-Arab movements, and especially its champions, the populist-military regimes
that sprang from the ruins of the 1948 fiasco, became the primary carrier of anti-
Semitism during the 1950s and 1960s. But despite its being a basically future-oriented
and secular movement, it often utilized elements of the Islamic past, including the
traditions brought forward by Quran interpreters regarding the Jews’ recalcitrant
and treacherous attitude towards Muhammad, in order to lend its animosity historic
status, depth and continuity. This Islamic dimension, however, remained secondary,
merely one among the many characteristics of Qawmiyya (pan-Arab nationalism) in
its struggle, centered around Palestine and its land (Wataniya ), and included as part
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of a Third World struggle against the forces of imperialism, the enemies of progress,
development and the abolition of backwardness. This ‘Third World’ context is the
fabric into which pan-Arabism has been woven from the 1950s onwards, so that
accepting the notion of an organic connection between Judaism and its schemes
and international capitalism was fairly easy (Karl Marx’s 1844 essay “On the Jewish
Question” became a seminal text in Arabic and Persian translations). Once again,
the cruelty of the Jews befits that of imperialism and has a collective characteristic,
as asserted by Muslim oral traditions and the interpreters of the Quran. Especially
active in the dissemination of such ideas was the nationalized film industry in Gamal
Abdel Nasser’s Egypt. Films about the Prophet’s times emphasized the themes of the
Jewish Shylock-style greed, as well as the Jewish proclivity for lust and its financial
exploitation (e.g. fathers trading their own daughters) – themes that do not appear
in the Quran. But more important was the covert and scheming hatred attributed to
the Jews of Medina in their dealings with the Prophet, and their cooperation with the
Qureish tribe, Muhammad’s sworn enemies. These plots were embroidered in several
films glorifying the Egyptian guerrilla war against Israel. Israel itself was depicted as a
country where Jews from Arab countries became forced laborers.
The 1967 war, the second turning point in the history of the conflict, also saw the
beginning of the decline of pan-Arabism as an ideological-political force all over the
Arab world. It is typical that when Anwar al-Sadat appealed to the Al-Azhar religious
scholars in the early ‘70s for a Fatwa (ruling) according to Muslim law to justify the
struggle, he did not use pan-Arabism as justification, but Islam. Thus was ushered
in the era of “the Return of Islam,” in Bernard Lewis’ apt coinage. The return, in the
sense that the agenda and priorities of Radical Islam now set the tone, and legitimacy
by religion became the sine qua non to all social forces wishing to have their voices
heard.
In general, the main outcome of the era of reemerging Islam is the view of Judaism
and Zionism as one monolithic whole (which was not the case prior to 1948), and
primarily – the Islam-Judaism struggle as an all-out, age-old global holy war that has
now reached its culmination, with the enemies of Islam enjoying the support of the
four superpowers and their all-invading culture (a.k.a. “spiritual imperialism”): from
Hollywood to the Internet, from invading armies to global economic interests. This
grand conception made headway even into conservative circles close to the Egyptian
and other regimes, from Indonesia to Africa, and is no longer a strictly Arab matter;
although it is prevalent mainly in the militant (not necessarily violent) circles in the
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core Muslim countries, from Afghanistan to Morocco, as well as among Muslim
immigrants in Europe (especially in light of their lack of societal integration and
their envy of the prospering Jews). The innately negative essence of Judaism is now
perceived as the cause of the conflict; it is not the conflict that justifies hostility to the
Jews.
The paradox, however, is that this cluster of negative qualities attributed to Judaism is
prevalent not among the most violent fanatics such as al-Qaeda or Sadat’s assassins,
but mainly among those who are mostly involved in da’wa (propaganda, education,
social action), whether by principle (rejecting violence) or from opportunism (i.e. fear
of the government’s response). This da’wa is leaking into conservative and traditional
currents that are not hostile to the regimes but support them.
Jihadist fanatics, on the other hand, tended during the 1970s to the 1990s to pay
mere lip service to the animosity towards Israel and Judaism, but less frequently
than the da’wa people. They usually stressed (even during the days of Nasser and
Sadat), that “the immediate enemy,” i.e. the rulers of their own countries, were the
real enemies, and that Palestine and the Jews should be addressed at a later stage,
when circumstances allow. (The exception was attacks on Jewish tourists, which the
militants regarded as desirable acts because they had an adverse effect on the regime’s
economy as well). The religious war is important only in relation to the territory of
the nation-state from which the particular fighting group came. (Of course Jihadist
Shiite fanaticism was particularly affected by the close relationship between Israel and
Shah’s regime, a relationship which was the object of Khomeini’s attacks while he was
still in exile).
Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the effectiveness of the da’wa factor,
both in inter-personal contacts, and through audio-visual or virtual media. These
create a sound basis with considerable overlap with the world of Jihad warriors on the
one hand, and the conservative-traditional (and ruling) sector, on the other.
This explains the revolutionary nature of the Al Qaeda consciousness that has
proliferated in the last decade. It seeks to create a universal avant-garde, the identity
of whose members (exiles, volunteers, immigrants) is exclusively Islamic, focusing
its utmost efforts on a given territory as dictated by the circumstances and based
on the principle of concentrated effort. The international framework is one of holy
war (Islam against Judaism and Christianity), a kind of modern reincarnation of the
12th-13th century Counter-Crusades in an era of globalization. In any interpretation of
18
the events, regardless of its distance from Palestine, world Jewry features as an active
factor, and more so in countries where Jews are prominent minorities.
The only components of the international Jihad movement that focus on Israel and
Zionism (excluding Al Qaeda bases in South Lebanon’s refugee camps), are those
marked by apocalyptic tendencies, such as the followers of Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi, a religious scholar of Palestinian origin currently incarcerated in Jordan,
formerly the mentor of Abu Musa’eb al-Zarkawi, the top al-Qaeda commander in Iraq,
or the Wahabi-Saudi adherents of Sheikh Salman al-Awda, who foresee Armageddon
before the Mahdi (Messiah) can arrive, in which the Jihad will face a formidable
struggle against the US as well as Israel. They are highly preoccupied with calculations
of the date of that final struggle and the deciphering of various signs heralding his
arrival. Up until now, their real effect is not being felt. At the other (non-international)
extreme of Jihad, there is a clear anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish Islamic obsession,
especially among Hamas, which draws mainly from an anti-Jewish historical reservoir
and constantly enriches it with Quranic interpretation as well as the hadith on Jewish
history (Isra’iliyyat), mainly in order to prove the fundamental depravity of Judaism,
which is the cause for the struggle over Palestine. This struggle is currently the top
priority of Jihad in order to liberate Islam from the repressive onslaught by modern
civilization, its economic and military supremacy, of Dar al -Islam (the Muslim world).
The connection between da’wa and Jihadist action in terms of motivation is thus
clear, and the media visibility of Hamas suicide missions makes it an important factor
in recruiting members for the general Jihad (not necessarily against Jews) among
Muslim immigrant populations in the West.
The main shift in the da’wa’s anti-Semitism in the last two decades has been the rise
of Holocaust denial (and its definition as a “yet another/renewed falsehood” and a
“giant conspiracy” propagated by inherently deceitful Jews). Attempts to deny and/
or to minimize the scope of the Holocaust had already been made by a Palestinian
national movement in 1945-1948, as part of its attempt to neutralize the mobilization
of global public opinion by the Zionists in favor of Jewish immigration to Palestine
(Aliyah), and the establishment of a Jewish state. But at the time, there was also an
important current in the Arab public opinion, led by prestigious Egyptian intellectuals
(such as Taha Hussein and Tawfik al-Hakim), who expressed shock at the scope of the
Holocaust and compassion for its victims. It was only in the early 1950s, following
the devastation of 1948, when voices in the Arab public began to question the actual
scale of the Holocaust and to rage against its “cynical exploitation” by the Zionists. A
18
sharp expression of such sentiment was the speech given at the Bandung Conference
(1955) by Dr. Charles Malik, the Lebanese scholar and diplomat. The emergence of the
theme of alleged Holocaust exploitation, exaggeration and fabrication was catalyzed
by Eichmann’s trial (1960-61) and the rapprochement between the Catholic Church
and Judaism during the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). The pan-Arab public
perceived both events as unfair moral victories of Judaism and as reinforcement for
the Zionist state which cuts apart Arab unity while propagating pitiful lies throughout
the allegedly enlightened world. In the 1980s, these themes gained huge support from
the supposedly scientific information provided by Holocaust deniers in Western
Europe, such as Garaudy, Roques, Faurisson and Irving, whose writings were promptly
translated into Arabic. There was also a Soviet influence in minimizing the Holocaust,
which is manifest, among others, in the Ph.D. thesis submitted by Mahmud Abbas
(Abu Mazen) to Moscow University’s Institute of Middle Eastern Studies (1982).
These notions and rationales soon transferred from pan-Arab literature into Islamist
literature, which conquered the cultural and political high ground. The cruelty,
treachery and deceitfulness that Islamists have found in Judaism from the days of
Muhammad have been newly vindicated here.
(Opinion polls conducted recently among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories,
as well as among Israeli Arabs, indicate that a considerable share of respondents
think that the scope of the Holocaust is exaggerated, and some refuse to believe it
altogether. We have no data for comparison from previous years, so it is impossible to
detect a trend, but the phenomenon is cause for concern).

19
CHAPTER 2:
ANIMOSITY AND DIALOGUE
Muslim anti-Semitism is undoubtedly burgeoning and thriving, especially in the
European diaspora, but also among Muslim publics that are involved in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (i.e. the Palestinians of the territories, but also in Jordan and
in Lebanon). In other Muslim countries, with the exception of Iran where state
propaganda disseminates it, the phenomenon exists and is on the increase, but its
depth and emotive power are lower (except during high-profile violence). The general
public is less involved in it, compared to militant groups, and even these are not
engaged in it on a daily basis, although anti-Jewish stereotypes are increasing with
time, becoming almost obvious clichés. The decline of pan-Arab solidarity in the last
two decades has also contributed to these developments.
As a grave and aggressive phenomenon, this strain of anti-Semitism calls for a
proactive, well-thought-out and assertive counter-action. But to what extent can such
a response be accompanied by the ‘soft power’ of rapprochement and dialogue?
It should be stressed that the findings described above are indeed severe, although
not in the bleak and hyperbolic style that marks certain institutions for the study of
anti-Semitism, sensationalist tabloids and communal leaders. There is no question
about the authenticity of the concern and pessimism conveyed by these leaders,
as they clearly express the sentiments of their constituencies, but honest feelings
must also be regarded in the proper context; and that context is historical-dynamic,
and is not based on essentialist hostility (as in “Ishmael is hostile to Israel from time
immemorial”).
Some of the findings – such as that the main problem is not the extreme faction of
Al Qaeda but the Muslim Brotherhood and the banalization of anti-Semitism among
traditional audiences – are, counter-intuitive. They contradict common inferences,
such as “the more radical Muslims are in their opinions, the more they are anti-
Semitic.” And there are implications for possible courses of actions.
Moreover, the picture may be a bit too bleak because it fails to consider two
phenomena: on the one hand, the emergence of intra-Arab and intra-Muslim
22
criticism of anti-Semitism (and Holocaust denial), which targets the same “political
public”; and on the other, the development of interfaith dialogue.
Self-criticism of Muslim-Arab anti-Semitism as a pathological and alarming
phenomenon in terms of the society’s indifference to universal human rights had
been raised already after the Six Days War, by a few thinkers, such as the important
Syrian philosopher Sadeq Jalal al-Azm. But it turned into a substantial current during
the 1990s, mainly among liberal publicists (some of them former Marxists) such as
the Lebanese Hazem Saghiya, Tunisian Salah Bechir, Palestinian politician Yasser Abd
Rabbo, Syrian Yassin al-Haj Saleh, Iraqi academic Kanan Makiya, Egyptian Muhammad
Abd al Munaim Said and their likes – all prominent figures who command important
public stages (such as the daily newspapers Al Hiyat and Al Ahram, and the Institute
of Strategic Studies).
Most of these critics regard anti-Semitism as the embodiment of negative, xenophobic
aspects of pan-Arab nationalism (or, alternately, modern Islam). In the apologetic
Radical Islam, or in Arab nationalism, the sentiments of jealousy and loathing are
extremely salient, so that, according to these critics, the ‘other’ is portrayed as evil
incarnate, an innately malevolent being. Two liberal Muslim Internet sites, al-Awan
and Shafaf al-Shark al-Awsat, consistently denounce manifestations of anti-Semitism.
The Al-Saki publishing house (Beirut and London), which has a well-established
distribution network, often publishes essays in the same vein.
But ultimately, this remains a small current, elitist in style and content, without any
major influence on the “political public,” and certainly lacking any effect on mass
media.
A much bigger and more salient volume of activity is produced by interfaith dialogue,
mostly Christian-Muslim, which for obvious reasons has developed especially in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Under the shadow of the Second Intifada and
increasing tensions in Western Europe, a similar Judeo-Muslim dialogue has evolved
as well.
This dialogue is expected to yield the following outputs:
1. To mitigate the effects of propaganda and polemics, and to eradicate stereotypes
and prejudices.1
1 Chapter 1 is full of examples from Islam. For a parallel Jewish approach, based on a conception of the
essence of Islam, see Bat Yeor, The Dhimmi, 1985.
23
2. To diminish (if not remove altogether) mutual fears, remove communication
failures, create an atmosphere of mutual trust and develop constructive ways
towards conflict resolution.
3. In all inter-group conflicts, the key issues are identity, foundation myths and
narratives that each side tells itself about itself and about the ‘other’. Thus, the very
listening to the myths and narratives of the other side, and discovering that they
are diverse, not uniform, are in themselves a prerequisite for conflict resolution.
Are such outputs being achieved, and if so, to what extent?
Even the most optimistic proponents of dialogue admit that the results so far are not
very uplifting. They are a long way away from fulfilling the wish of Dr. David Rosen,
a leading champion of interfaith diplomacy, who maintains that if we do not want
religion to be part of the problem, then it must be made part of the solution, and
that a constructive integration of the religious leadership is vital to the fight against
prejudice.
It should be said, however, that the scope and persistence of this activity, despite the
disappointments, are quite impressive, especially in Western Europe. Yet, it could be
argued that such activity is the equivalent of the boy who tried to block the leak in the
dike with his finger to prevent a flood.
The following is a schematic map of selected initiatives:
Institutional Initiatives: International Summit Conventions
Meetings of religious leaders of international stature, along with leading ethical,
religious and political notables (such as Eli Weisel, Alain Finkelkraut, Chief Rabbi
for Israel Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron, Sheikh al Azhar Tantawi, philosopher Mohamed
Arkoun, etc.). The objective of such encounters is their visibility in the media and
among the believers. The thrust for such initiatives increased greatly after the 9/11
terror attacks and found its expression in the Alexandria Convention – a location
of great symbolic value for the dialogue of ancient civilizations – in January 2006.
It was followed by other gatherings, including the World Congress of Imams and
Rabbis for Peace (March 2006), The Kazakhstan Conference on Religious Tolerance
(September 2006) and the Alexandria Conference on Interfaith Issues in January 2008.
These meetings were characterized by hundreds of attendees and observers, flowery
speeches in praise of pluralism and open debate, vague closing declarations which
tended to blur differences, and primarily, to conceal the fact the militant minority
24
– if it is indeed just a minority – excites the believers’ imagination, especially in Islam,
and has obtained hegemony in terms of setting the agenda in the public sphere. As is
customary in international conferences, public relations work is the main activity, and
there is no substantial dialogue, although ‘corridor encounters’ have the added value
of discovering the ‘other’ and/or maintaining relations with them.
These weaknesses were augmented by other shortcomings: an exaggerated emphasis
on theology, which stems from the model of the intra-Christian and intra-Jewish
dialogue, and the fact that the majority of institutional religious leaders are suspected
by the believers, not necessarily the militants among them, to be accommodating
collaborators of the regimes. These faults keep recurring in the undoubtedly wellmeaning
initiatives for interfaith dialogue undertaken by US Federal agencies,
UNESCO and the European Union. In short, much ado about nothing. In the long
term, their imprint on the public sphere is almost imperceptible.
Institutional Initiatives: Jewish Bodies and Religious Non-
Profit Organizations
Given the bitterness and jealousy rampant in Islam in relation to the Jews, many
communal leaders have decided not to invest their limited resources in dialogue, and
to conduct only perfunctory and irregular meetings with Muslim leaders. Those who
argue that this is a self-fulfilling prophecy may be right, but one should not ignore the
rational judgment of communal leaders, following the disappointing experience of
international conferences and the lack of emotional willingness of their congregations
to “offer the other cheek.” There is therefore an ongoing effort to maintain the dialogue
by over-arching institutions such as the AJC in the US, the Board of Deputies in Britain,
and the CRIF in France, but in each of these locations, its persistence depends on the
existence of a few ‘possessed’ individuals, who soon tire out. The only place where
a systematic effort is being made is Canada, where Jewish institutions emphasize the
creation of alliances with Muslim activities on general public issues (homophobia, gay
marriages, adoption), in which they find a common ethical basis for result-oriented
public activity (such as changing the laws), stemming from common monotheistic
tenets. In each case, the issue pertains to religious conduct, not theology, in keeping
with the nature of Judaism and Islam as religions in which the “will do” precedes
the “will hear,” preferring Sharia and Halacha to theology, unlike Christianity, where
debates about the main tenets of belief, whether intra-Christian or in relation to
‘other’ religions, are paramount.
Educational Programs
Education should be a key instrument in reducing prejudice, complaints and
grievances. No wonder a considerable effort has been invested in various countries
in youth encounters, educational enrichment programs, student exchanges between
schools, professional encounters (mainly among educators) and/or neighbor
encounters. Most of the programs are not professionally planned or nationally
coordinated. The exception is the Anne Frank Institute in Amsterdam, which has
developed professional programs in a number of languages, and conducted periodical
and systematic professional evaluations to determine their value and impact. Another
example in the same spirit is Neveh Shalom in Israel, but that initiative takes a different
context – that of the Israeli-Arab conflict – which has not been imitated, although
professional evaluations have indicated that it could diminish racial stereotypes. It is
obvious that only an inter-personal structured encounter between Muslim and Jewish
populations (such as youngsters), who ordinarily do not get to meet each other, could
reduce demonization and simplistic images, but not only is the educational activity
in this respect highly inadequate, but also external, high-profile events (the Second
Intifada, violent incidents in Western Europe, etc.) have had a simultaneous negative
effect, not to mention the constant agitation by religious fanatics that relentlessly
trickles its venom.
Local-Institutional Initiatives
Many initiatives on a local municipal level have flourished, especially in France, in
towns and suburbs where large concentrations of Jews and Muslims reside (with the
majority of Jewish residents of North-African origin with a difficult legacy of negative
experiences and stereotypes). Especially notable were Marseilles as well as Créteil
and Sarcelles (both lower-middle class suburbs in Paris’s ‘outer circle’). The success in
thwarting hostility and consolidating good neighborly relationships, especially in light
of the incidents among youth during the beginning of the second Intifada, stemmed
from the fact that the representatives of both sides (members of the municipal
councils, police chiefs) interacted with both authentic and unofficial leaders; in
some cases, rabbis and imams, some of them highly popular, also took part in the
negotiations. An exemplary model for all such initiatives is the Marseilles-Espérance
initiative, undertaken by the mayor of Marseilles himself, who set it as a focus for a
town identity that is built on co-existence. Thanks to this effort, the suburban riots
26
of late 2005 never affected Marseilles in general, and the relationship of Jewish and
Muslim communities (in mixed residence areas) in particular. Another example is
the suburb of Bagneux, near Paris, where neighborhood initiatives (assisted by local
social workers) succeeded in creating a regular, mediated dialogue mechanism which
prevented riots following the brutal murder of local resident Ilan Halimi by a gang of
Muslim fanatic criminals in February 2006.
Grassroots Dialogue Groups
Such initiatives are multiplying especially in Israel, but there the religious and ethnic
elements are thoroughly intertwined. Generally, initiatives are more successful among
Israeli Arabs than among residents of the Occupied Territories, most likely because
the latter are too preoccupied with their sense of oppression and bitterness to allow
any positivity. In Israel too, success is greater when the encounters have a concrete
goal (such as care of disabled children, women’s status, environmental issues, etc.).
In most cases, about two thirds of the participants are women, perhaps because their
capacity for empathy is more developed than in male cohorts. Groups comprising
women only were particularly successful, owing, among other things, to the orthodox
rules of conduct in both populations, which prohibit the mixing of the sexes.
In the Diaspora, there is a similar phenomenon of local initiatives, but it is mostly
religion-based: for instance, Sufis and Cabalists, study groups (usually of men who
work together on interpreting sacred texts), student groups, etc. The political and
civic aspect is mostly absent from such initiatives.
In general, no longitudinal studies have been conducted to examine changes in
stereotypes as a result of the encounters (with the exception of the Anne Frank
Institute in Amsterdam and Neveh Shalom in Israel), so that we are left with mere
impressions, which are of course better than nothing. In certain cases, such as
pacifying the public after incidents or riots in Western Europe, the very prevention of
collective negative phenomena from recurring is in itself an important achievement.
However, many of these initiatives are short-lived and tend to be transient, as can
be expected of any voluntary action. Moreover, the overall ethnic-cultural context
in each country determines the value of such initiatives. In secular France, where the
spokespersons of Islam are usually secular, coming from the fields of philosophy or
psychiatry, what is the value of maintaining dialogue with Jewish scholars? Religious
27
figures (moderate and extremist alike) are marginal in both communities. In contrast,
in the UK, where religious pluralism is promoted, there is a certain value in interfaith
encounters. Thus the Leo Beck College (which qualifies liberal rabbis in London)
holds regular meetings on Sundays between its pupils and the pupils of the Jamai’ya
al Islamia’s Imam Qualification Seminar. A typical gathering begins with ping-pong
games and continues with a comparative discussion of Halacha and Sharia (a good
topic, because it is here, and not in philosophy, which the French love so much, that
the two religions really meet).
As an interim conclusion: There are in this issue more question marks than proven
factual findings. But regardless of all the doubts, initiatives for the development of
inter-personal and inter-communal relationships must not be stopped. Even if they
do not help, they will certainly do no harm, and sometimes may even be highly
beneficial.
An interesting and more constructive dialogue is already being woven between
thousands of visitors from Iran (and the Iranian diaspora) and the Persian-language
version of the Yad VaShem website; the correspondence reveals a deep and pluralistic
interest in the Holocaust and in Judaism. A similar interest is revealed in the responses
to the Arab-language version, inaugurated in January 2008.
Economic Relationships
The dialogues discussed above are based on the exchange of words and concepts.
But exchange of goods and services should be considered as well, especially between
Jewish (and to a certain extent Israeli) and Muslim companies.
In the Arab world and in South-East Asia, this is important not only for the creation
of common interests, but also, and mainly, for the creation of a common conceptual
world, particularly because in the world of Islam traders constitute a group of
influential notables (wujaha). It is no coincidence that Saudi businessmen, alarmed
at the threat of Iranian hegemony, recently showed interest in proposing a pan-
Islamic solution that would protect the Holy Basin of Jerusalem jointly with the
Chief Israeli Rabbinate and the Vatican. Businessmen in Morocco, Tunisia and Qatar
have invested considerable efforts in developing pre-diplomatic economic relations
between their respective countries and Israel. Certain beginnings in this direction are
already underway with investments by Jewish companies in Malaysia and Indonesia,
27

although it cannot be said that they are already bearing fruit in terms of the fabric of
the relationship between the civil societies. In an opinion poll conducted in Egypt in
2009 on attitudes toward ‘normalization’ of relations (i.e. close relations) with Israel,
businessmen were the only socio
a notion.
CHAPTER 3:

The severity of the findings described in Chapter 1 calls for a proactive and probably
somewhat aggressive strategy, but in order to formulate a strategy one needs to fully
understand the implications of the current and expected circumstances, in all their
complexity. It should be stressed – we speak about the
IMPLICATIONScurrent situation.
This is not about a struggle between civilizations, not about some eternal theological
enmity that allegedly originates in the Quran, in the relationship between Muhammad
and the Jews of the Arabian Peninsula, or in the status of the
ascribed to the Jews, a status which in itself has undergone many transformations in
place and time (see Chapter 1). Some Muslim thinkers and writers use the argument
of the ‘civilizational struggle’, but it is a mere rhetorical
no factual basis whatsoever.
dhimma (‘protected’)-propagandist trick, which has
1. The most important implication is counter
common sense. The most radical stream in the Islamic movement, i.e. Al Qaeda, fell
apart in the wake of the blows dealt to the organization during October
2001, and split into several semi
within the Islamic world and its diaspora. Still, the Al Qaeda stream preserved
a strong common denominator, which finds expression in its being pan
(strategic management of the revolution according to the situation of Islam internally,
and in relation to its external enemies, led by the US), transnational, and even antinational
(in terms of nation
-intuitive, in that it seems to contradict-December-autonomous groups (jama’at), mostly territoriallybased-Islamic −-state, wataniyya), and not just anti-Qawmiyya (pan-
Arabism), as in less radical factions. This is a major novelty, because in the past,
the nation
transitional phase towards the renewal of Muslim political unity. The pioneers of
radicalism, founded by Said Kutab in Egypt in the late 1950s, regarded the nationstate
as an entrenched entity which enjoyed the affiliation, loyalty and even love of
the masses.
Al Qaeda claims that the nation
of greed, of the capitalistic variety, which empty the lives of Muslims of any substantial
content. Muslims in the diaspora in particular must not associate with each other
30
based on their national origin, but instead should identify and organize as
-state was considered by Islamic radicals as a necessary, almost inevitable-state cult is a kind of modern idolatry, just as the idolsMuslimun
or
where immigrants and exiles got together anyway and were generally labeled as
Muslims by the host environment. But in Islamic countries as well, a strong sentiment
has emerged, especially among the battalions of volunteers for the war against the
Soviets in Afghanistan (in 1980), in the rear bases in Pakistan, and later among those
who volunteered for the fights in Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosovo (and now in Iraq),
the experience and identity are firstly pan
influenced local organizations (as in Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia), which then
merged into Al Qaeda. The most recent ‘acquisition’ came from Algeria – the most
consolidated nation
The GSPC (Muslim Jama’a for propaganda and Jihad) joined Al Qaeda and became
a combatant movement for the liberation of the entire Maghreb. Recently, there have
been signs of similar phenomena in Libya, Yemen and Somalia.
Within such ideology and experience – which, one should bear in mind, exclusively
characterize the Sunni world – the main external enemy is Western culture and
its military and economic extensions, headed by the USA. Israel is a small, albeit
exasperating ally. And in the eyes of Al Qaeda adherents in the Maghreb, the danger
of France – the US’s objective ally – cannot be compared to the danger of the Jews,
which is much smaller. The issue of Palestine as well, although covered in much
rhetoric, is not an obsession. Ayman al
that this is a secondary problem, “whose day will come,” and that at present there are
other regions in the Muslim world that provide a much better opportunity for the
actions of the mighty fist of Muslim volunteers, launched from a firm basis (
sulba
is a non
or Yemen (ditto). Israel’s might, a hard nut to crack, makes Palestine less attractive for
their strategy. And of course the fact that the main Palestinian Islamic power, Hamas,
has a strong
‘pan
secondary objective for Al Qaeda, if not less.
It is therefore not surprising that in a quantitative content analysis conducted using
the Opinion
anti
that the founder of Al Qaeda, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, was a Jordanian of Palestinian
31
origin crops up immediately, it is emphasized that his transnational identity had been
forged during the Afghanistan war.
In other radical movements, in the style of
Egypt, Syria, etc., the incidence of anti
higher. In radical movements seeking to implement Sharia law in their countries using
legal means (whether because they despaired of Jihad against the strong state or were
in principle against the use of violence), the incidence was six times higher. While the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is not as willing as it had been in 1948 to volunteer for
Jihad in Palestine, they and their constituency (which won them a fifth of the seats
in the Egyptian parliament in the November
sympathetic to Hamas, regard it as an exemplary body, empathize with the suffering
of Palestine and use its tragedy to mobilize hostility against the US – “the
Mu’minun (believers). This imperative had been easier to enforce in the dispersion,-Islamic. That common experience had-state in the Arab world, born out of a war of independence.-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s deputy, keeps reiteratingqaeda) located at the margins of the Muslim world, for instance in Afghanistan, which-state, Chechnya (another non-state), Bosnia (ditto), Somalia (a failed state)watani orientation, seeking to liberate Palestine and sharply criticizing-Islamic excuses’ for non-action, further explains why Palestine is merely a-Mining method; we found in Al Qaeda publications a low frequency of-Semitic and anti-Israeli themes, and almost no Holocaust denial. While the factJama’at Jihadiyya for the liberation of-Israeli and anti-Semitic themes was five times-December 2005 elections) are veryde facto
ruler of Egypt.”
Similar findings were collected for radical organizations in Europe that are not
affiliated with Al Qaeda.
against global anti
“The War on Terror” is therefore not identical to the struggle-Semitism.
2. The second implication is the trend of Islamization (or theologization) of the
Israeli
both Shiite and Sunni, into a hostage of the Palestine
process are found in the 1967 defeat, symbolized by the
-Arab conflict in the last generation, which is turning Muslim anti-Semitism,-Israel conflict. The roots of thisfatwa issued by the Ulama
(religious scholars) of Al Azhar University in 1968, at the request of Nasser, which
posited the “forceful liberation of the occupied lands” as an act of Jihad – not just
as an implementation of Sharia, but as an act of transcendental dimensions. The
religious revival in Israel, which regarded its victory as “the beginning of salvation” and
return to the holy sites, had its mirror image reflected in the Muslim world, and thus
a connection of perpetual feedback was created between the two religious revival
movements, the Jewish and the Muslim. But the religious establishment harnessed
itself voluntarily, in the last days of Nasser and the beginning of the Sadat era, to the
effort to emphasize the religious dimension of the conflict, using the fall of Jerusalem
into the hands of the Jews, which indeed was received as an authentic shock by
the Islamic world, in order to incite and inflame the masses. In addition, any action
taken by the national religious movement in Israel was perceived as confirming this
argument. What had been a Zionist
32
the shape of Judaism vs. Islam. The stories of Muhammad and the Jews in the Arabian
Peninsula, the
became salient themes in propaganda and education, including seminars held in the
Egyptian army in preparation for the October 1973 war.
But the main push for Islamization was brought on by the Muslim resurgence – be
it radical, conservative or mystical (Sufi) – throughout the Middle East and Africa,
which from the 1980s on has spread to Western Europe as well. Its most severe impact
was among the Palestinian public, which until then was led by a secular movement,
the Fatah (although it contained an Islamic faction led by Abu
underwent Islamization, as manifested in the rise of Islamic Jihad from 1984 on.
But the most tremendous phenomenon occurred within the Palestinian Muslim
Brotherhood movement in Palestine, which up to that point had been concerned
only with reinstating righteousness in society.
From the mid
to regard the conflict with Israel as a first priority. Fearing of losing this activist and
idealistic generation to Fatah (or to Islamic Jihad), in 1987
Brotherhood (under Sheikh Ahmad Yasin) changed its course. Thus Hamas was born,
positing the eradication of Israel as a fundamental Muslim commandment, which is
also a fair retaliation for the crimes of Judaism against Islam throughout the sweep
of history. The important contribution of this theological concept is “the historic
necessity of the disappearance of Israel” (also the title of a popular book in the
movement’s circles) – a concept which builds confidence that the struggle is sure to
end in victory, even if the road leading there is fraught with difficulties and setbacks.
Thanks to the first Intifada, Hamas became a role model for all the Sunni movements
of the world, and even more so when suicide attacks were first launched.
The writings of the Muslim Brotherhood everywhere are now rife with quotations and
statements regarding the character of the Jews, based on Quran verses and linked to
current attitudes towards them in light of the present situation. Such characteristics
produce stereotypes, such as that the Jews were deceitful and treacherous towards
Muhammad, and so one may infer that then as now, the Jews will not honor a peace
agreement, will not reconcile and will not make peace, because the innate nature of
the Jews prevents them from living in peace with others. What was true for the tribes
of
lifetime is true for Israel today.
33
From the Quran the Muslim Brotherhood also learn about the treacherous and
deceitful nature of the Jews of the Arabian Peninsula, and from the Book of Nehemiah
they learn about the ungratefulness of the Jews, who kept on sinning and rebelling
against God despite the miracles he had bestowed upon them. This suggests that the
Jews are not the Chosen People, but a people who have earned the grace of God for
a while, and then were finally punished as befitting their moral depravity. A similar
lesson is drawn from the biblical story of the spies: God promised the Holy Land to
the Jews, but they procrastinated and were filled with fear – their hearts lacked faith.
They wanted to receive the land on a sliver platter, and that is why they were punished
and banished to the desert for forty years.
The danger of the Jews, a.k.a. ‘World Zionism,’ which will only be exacerbated if a peace
treaty is signed with them, stems from their control over world economy and media,
especially in the US, their striving to expand that control and their contribution to
the propagation of avarice throughout the entire world (especially in Muslim lands).
Normalization between Israel and the Arabs must be avoided at all costs in order
to prevent a stealthy penetration and diffusion of Israeli/Jewish culture, its corrupt
essence and ubiquitous political control.
In Shia circles, the course has been somewhat different. Since 1979, the revolutionary
Shia has been in power in Iran. Today the Shia’s position is identical to that of the
Iranian regime, which is soaked in Third World anti
between the Iranian regime and Palestine had been authentic – certainly because
Israel had cooperated with the Shah and his domestic intelligence agency (Savak), but
it also served as a manipulative tool for the fortification of Shiite hegemony in the
region and assailing the Sunni regimes collaborating with the US (and some with Israel
as well). The first and second Lebanese Wars aggravated the phenomenon, embodied
in the slogan “From Tehran to Jerusalem and from there to Mecca” (for Shia, the seat
of the most detested Sunni regime). Obviously here the conflict is instilled with Shiite
themes of the Jews’ impurity, their betrayal of Shia founder Ali Ibn Talib, and so on.
Iranian propaganda harps on classic themes of Jew hatred, such as greed and pilfering,
which have always been used to slander Jews; the robbery of Palestine from its lawful
owners is but one recent example of that. This argument features frequently not only
in Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches, but also in statements by Khatami and Rafsanjani
in 2003, praising Hitler for annihilating the Jews.
34
Why are the Jews hated? The Iranian answer is twofold. On the one hand, the Jews
project power and prominence, and on the other, their meager numbers convey
vulnerability. The Jewish success raises questions about the source of the power of this
“global tribe”, and at the same time raises suspicions of a Jewish conspiracy running
the world. Indeed, “World Zionism” is defined as Iran’s enemy Number 1, whereas
Israel is only rated at number 4, following the US (2) and Britain (3). This ranking is
confirmed by a statistical frequency analysis based on the Opinion
It runs across the entire body of speeches and sermons made by the Iranian leader Ali
Khamenei.
These are all fed by a traditional Shiite hostility towards the Jews, which has always
been less tolerant than the Sunni brand of Islam that dominated Iran until 1501. It
should be mentioned, however, that other minorities suffered as well under the first
Shiite dynasty, the Safavids (1501
believers and non
a Shiite Muslim is forbidden to marry a non
(
in the market. It is no coincidence that
granting equal right to non
(1906
The Islamic revolution of 1979 intensified the hostility, for it regarded Israel as the
focus of the global struggle against post
the US. Indeed, Ahmadinejad is not the first Iranian leader to call for the annihilation
of Israel. Ayatollah Khamenei called for its eradication already in 2000, and a year
later, the reformist president Khatami repeated this call in an interview with CNN,
as did another relatively moderate politician, Rafsanjani, who was twice president
and chairman of the Iranian parliament and currently officiates as Chairman of the
Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Discernment Council. Rafsanjani expressed
his regret that Hitler failed to finish the job of annihilating the Jews, which was justified
because it was aimed against the Zionist control of Europe. Common to all of these
leaders is the notion endorsed by Khomeini, regarding the global struggle between
the Third World and colonialism, spearheaded by Israel, which therefore deserves to
be annihilated. Rafsanjani’s view is typical of the Israeli paradox: Israel manipulates the
US and Britain, and at the same time, it is a tiny and artificial entity. All these elements
are taken from Khomeini’s famous attack on Israel in his book,
-Palestinian or Israeli-Arab conflict gradually tookdhimma issue, and the role of the Jews in the doomsday scenario all-Jihad). Even Fatah-1980s, a young generation emerged in the Brotherhood of Gaza seeking-88 the leadership of theBanu Nadir , Banu Qurayza and Banu Qaynuqa in the city of Medina in Muhammad’s-imperialist ideology. The linkage-Mining method.-1722). Shia emphasizes the separation between-believers, expressed in terms of purity versus impurity. Therefore-Muslim woman. The Jew, being impurenajasa), cannot drink water from a Muslim’s cup and is forbidden to touch vegetablesulama were at the front of the struggle against-Muslims during the constitutional revolution in Iran-11).-colonial imperialism and a primary lackey ofIslamic Government
35
(1970), in which, it should be noted, the emphasis is on Israel and not on the Jews. (A
positive change has occurred only in one aspect: according to regime propagandists,
the Jews as members of a religion are not impure; what is impure is organized world
Jewry, which seeks to control the entire globe).
The popularization of such ideas is carried out mostly through Iranian state
television, which frequently airs quasi
perpetrated by the IDF against Palestinian citizens, or ‘illustrates’ in period dramas the
collaboration between Zionists and the Nazis. More than a few documentary series
have focused on the Zionist plot to overtake Iran and/or the world (for example, one
such series set out to prove that the Zionists took over and now control Hollywood).
On the quasi
Holocaust denial, under the supervision of Ahmadinejad’s advisor, Muhammad Ali
Ramin. Ramin is also responsible for organizing in November 2008 (in response to
Obama’s victory) the Tehran conference titled “The Holocaust – a Holly Lie of the
West.” In the last decade, Iran has begun to disseminate these ideas among Muslim
immigrants in Western Europe, the majority of whom are Sunni. Since 1999 their
mouthpiece in Germany has been Muslim Markt, a high
website, was built in Bremen, edited by Yavuz Ozoguz, a Shiite Turk who holds a Ph.D.
from a German Polytechnic and specializes in anti
-owned-documentaries depicting the atrocities-academic level, studies are undertaken to confirm the claims of-quality German-language-Catholic, anti-Semitic and anti-
Israeli propaganda.
The ideas we found in these Sunni movements are finding their way from the Muslim
Brotherhood (and this term includes the circles of the AKP party in power in Turkey)
into other, younger circles within the Muslim establishment, such as
Jamiyat Ulama al -
Azhar
of Muhammad, and regularly propagates anti
moderate position of Sheikh al Azhar al Tantawi. In Europe this trend has dominated
large organizations such as the UOIF in France (which endorses even ‘independent’
and anti
Liberation Party (
often cooperate with left
denial, solidarity with Palestine or boycotting Israel, increases their danger.
36
3. We are thus faced with a “core consciousness,” that is, a cluster of fundamental
beliefs and worldviews that is passed on from generation to generation, in which the
Jew is perceived as:
1. Hostile to Islam right from its inception.
2. Cunning, deceitful, not to be trusted, and treacherous.
3. Member of an angry, pedantic and strict religion, as opposed to Islam, which is the
“religion of the middle,” “the golden road,” a tolerant and lenient religion.
These three elements are the contribution of the past, and they originate mainly
in the polemics of Muhammad and the Jews in Arabia. The importance of another
historical component, Judaism as the religion of the
low”), which in pre
decreased due to the changing circumstances relevant to a given time, and eventually
relegated to a “situational consciousness,” that is, attitudes and emotions related to
a specific issue that is time
immigrants in the West, where it is contrasted with the inferior status of Jews in
Islamic countries.
These three elements have been augmented in the core consciousness by three
additional elements, contributed by the Israeli
4.
status and occupied an undeserved dominant position, full of vanity and selfimportance,
seeking to control all, especially Muslims.
5. The Jew as the ruler of al-Quds (Jerusalem), i.e. the third most holy city in Islam (the
Hamas conception of Palestine as the Holy Land is also a “situational consciousness,”
but this is a Palestinian
world).
6. The brutal Jew, one who abuses citizens, women and children, is a theme that
emerged mostly in the wake of the first Intifada, but is rooted in the concepts of
Palestinian Azzat Drawza, and its foundations were laid during the period of indepth
bombing of Egypt, in 1969
Alongside all these, motifs from European anti
consciousness, whether directly or via Eastern Christianity:
• The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the world conspiracy: This is important
mostly as an explanation for the Muslims’ defeat by Israel, which evoked a cognitive
dissonance. This theme integrates comfortably with an Islamic political culture
that is rife with conspiracy theories in general.
37
• Holocaust denial (or minimization): This element has been added especially since
the establishment of the State of Israel, beginning as a situational consciousness,
i.e., time and space
the core consciousness. Another foreign element, the
part of the core consciousness, and appears mainly as situational consciousness in
countries with an Eastern
The above implications are all embracing. However, there is a concurrent trend
in which the specific national
weight of new Muslim anti
a relatively new realm in which this type of anti
the past thirty years, and in particular during the last decade. A good example of
this is the differences between France and the UK. Both are countries whose Muslim
populations had come in droves from the territories of the former empires, mainly
from rural and culturally disadvantaged regions, and were employed – mainly the
parents’ generation – in menial jobs, providing an unskilled to semi
collar workforce for the reconstruction of post
based on ‘second
mining, etc.). In both countries, members of the second generation of immigrants
are faced with the challenges of ‘third
information, knowledge and communications and requires different skills (mainly
intellectual), which these young people (mostly the males) lack due to discrimination
in schooling, their concentration in culturally disadvantaged areas, and discrimination
in labor market on ethnic
has been the emergence of a belligerent Islam, protesting the deprivation and injustice
of the hypocritical Western culture. As a prominent symbol of success in that culture,
the Jews are an obvious object of envy and animosity, even before the effect of the
Israeli
On the face of it, both France and the UK are faced with the same situation, but in
actual fact – what a difference!
The British context, certainly from the 1980s on, is underpinned by:
a. Increasing participation rates of immigrants and their offspring (arriving from
the British Commonwealth) in representation in local, regional and national
government. This is made possible by the automatic granting of citizenship to
British Commonwealth nationals, and the growing interest of political parties and
societal organizations in recruiting “new blood” to their ranks.
38
b. At the same time, all surveys indicate that the rates of discrimination (in
employment, housing, education) are constantly dropping, thanks to systematic
application and monitoring of the 1980 legislation which resulted from inter
and inter
inter
c. Survey after survey consistently shows that there is a growing awareness among
the British public, including the lower socio
ethnic distinctions are legitimate. An important vector for the dissemination of
such awareness is an ongoing field activity coordinated by inter
where activists learn to cooperate with each other.
d. Because the basic attitude to religion in Britain is positive, it is possible to conduct
a legitimate and rational public debate about giving expression to Islam, which is
the religion of a considerable share of immigrants from the Indian sub
and finding ‘live
Against this background, it is clear why Muslim extremism (whether violent or nonviolent)
has had no appeal for the vast majority of Muslims residing in Britain. They
have an infinite range of other options for self
for social mobility. Within a single generation, the children of illiterate Pakistani laborers
are enrolled in state colleges, although not in the top universities (where the Hindus,
who came from the more culturally advanced regions of India, are more prominent).
According to a governmental report published in late 2007, the percentage of students
who have at least five GCSEs (examinations marking the completion of secondary
education) is 58% for the general population, 56% for Bangladeshi students, 65% for
Pakistani and 72% among students of Indian descent.
Muslim British citizens are entitled to express their rage about the war in Iraq, or
the occupation of other Muslim lands by infidels, as part of a broad British political
movement in which different people with various motivations are partners – as is
common in any mass movement. In this way, they can express their objection to US
imperialism alongside moderate and extreme left
influence and pride. Thus they eventually gain a sense of belonging, which operates
first and foremost on the communal, neighborhood level, in face
recent report has found that 78% of Muslims identify themselves as British, compared
to 49% who consider themselves French and 23% who feel German (The Daily
Telegraph, Dec. 29, 2009).
39
Anti
movements in Britain are usually careful to avoid it. Nevertheless, a survey conducted
by the conservative Policy Exchange Institute found in October 2007 that in a quarter
of the hundred mosques examined, sermons with anti
preached (with or without Holocaust denial), or anti
are disseminated (mostly from Saudi Arabia). This type of material is available, among
others, at the central London mosque in Regent Park. The fact that nearly all British
Imams are natives of Pakistan only increases their proclivity for such themes, to which
they have been extensively exposed in their homeland.
But in effect, only one radical movement, The Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al Tahrir,
founded in the West Bank during Jordanian rule and currently centered in the UK), has
made anti
And what about France?
France is characterized by a high degree of centralism, and thus the prevailing
perception is that its inhabitants are equal, but as individuals, which prevents any of
the rectifying discrimination/affirmative action of the British model. President Sarkozy
launched an attempt to break this 200
financial crisis he lacks the resources needed. And yet only such affirmative action
could alleviate the real distress of the Muslim population that arrived in France as a
menial labor force; while they did come from countries formerly dominated by France,
they were received only as temporary residents. It was not until 1973 that their status
was revised to permanent residents and they were allowed to bring their families over
to France. Crowded into huge, cheap housing projects on the margins of the big cities,
their schools were considered inferior, and French teachers working there set their
Maghrebi pupils’ expectations very low (at least for boys; girls are known to be highly
industrious in their schooling, as education is often their ticket to breaking away from
their father’s or older brother’s control). These areas have rapidly become infested with
crime and drugs, attracting youth populations with high crime and school dropout
rates. A culture of second and third generation poverty has evolved, as a result of the
state’s lack of investment in immigrants (housing, education, sanitation) – an ongoing
neglect exacerbated by the fact that the non
(not even the right to vote for municipal government). The children of immigrants are
entitled to apply for citizenship at age 18, and it is usually granted automatically, but
it does require any proactive initiative on the part of these youngsters, who in at least
40
half the cases forego their right, whether out of apathy or ignorance (or, in the last
decade, out of a growing sense of alienation from France).
This is the context for a predictable hostility towards the state and the dominant
culture, in which the Jews – certainly after 1945 – play a central role. The dazzling
success of Maghrebi Jews, who in a single generation have managed to attain an
economic and educational level that took their Ashkenazi brethren three generations
to attain, only serves to intensify the envy and sense of grievance and deprivation.
The explanation given for this by Islamists is that the Jews have used the Holocaust
to get preferential treatment from the French state and culture, which are totally
hypocritical and wishing to atone for the sins of the Vichy regime. Such an explanation
enables the Muslims to avoid difficult questions: Why did Jewish immigrants invest
so much in their children’s education while we have not? Is it really all due to state
discrimination? (It must be noted, however, that there were indeed instances of
political discrimination by the French establishment: The Jews of Algeria, evacuated to
France when Algeria gained independence in 1962, were immediately granted French
citizenship and adaptation funds, similar to other French
Jews in Algeria had enjoyed equal rights already since 1870. In contrast, the Muslims
who left or were evacuated at the same time, and especially the Harkis, collaborator
militiamen who fought on the French side, were not only denied citizenship in return
for their service, along with their family members, but they were concentrated in
economically backward regions in the center of France, most remaining ignorant and
eventually developing a multi
The immigrants’ anti
nature, is a strong channel for venting hostility and alienation, which focuses not only
on violent expressions but also on clichéd prejudices. Most of the third
Muslims no longer know any Jews personally, because the Sephardic Jews managed
to extract themselves from the poverty
savings. But while their forefathers maintained reasonable neighborly relations with
the Jews, here, the lack of actual contact has engendered among the third
Muslim immigrants a strong, diffused and virtual hostility (the latter term refers
mainly to the salient presence of Jews in the media, politicians, news anchors and
entertainment hosts, and as ‘talking heads,’ TV pundits such as Bernard
and Alain Finkielkraut). This is a new version of the “anti
which has been prevalent in Poland and Hungary since 1945.
41
It is interesting to note that the most prominent Jews who attract such envy are
Sephardi Jews, whose success, by the way, is often widely covered with admiration
by the French media, in magazines, news weeklies and gossip columns (as in the
case of President Sarkozy’s ex
There is an authentic, if not justified, general feeling that the government reacts more
forcefully to acts of arson against synagogues (and anti
than to acts of arson in mosques (and other Islamo
indifference of the Muslim community to the brutal 2006 murder of Ilan Halimi by the
Muslim gang that calls itself the Barbarians.
This envy and sense of deprivation in Islamic ideology comes almost naturally because
of another, deeper reason: If there is anything in Islam that resembles a cultural
tradition that is close to ‘essence’ (
Eastern studies), it is the sense of an ideal of justice on earth, the infringement of
which provokes an especially deep protest and mobilizes extremely high emotional
resources (according to the German Islamic scholar Josef Van Ess).
The centrality of the idea of justice and redressing wrong
already in the Quran, especially during the Mecca period (until 622), when Muhammad
was an spokesman on behalf of the down
notion has always played a major part in the revolutionary (particularly messianic)
movements throughout Muslim history.
But at the same time, it has a universal element – as a motivation in conflict
situations. For instance, game theory experts Simon Gaechter and Ernest Fehr found
out in games based on labor conflicts, that from the point of view of employees, the
material
fairness being infringed, and that people are willing to pay a considerable price in
lost wages, in order to remain on strike until an employer who is perceived as unfair
surrenders to their demands.
Indeed, in Opinion
by radical Islamic movements, the incidence of the argument of protesting injustice is
much higher than that of other issues such as honor and the redressing of humiliation,
which the prevalent stereotype regards as typical Muslim or Arab motivation.
The revolutionary power of the concept of injustice may be assessed from comparative
studies of Communist revolutions in the 20
, the body that inspired, among others, the battle against the Danish caricatures-Semitic ideas in Egypt, in contrast to the-Semitic preachers like Hassan Iquioussen), BAM in Britain, and the IslamicHizb al Tahrir ) in Britain and in Italy. The fact that such organizations-wing bodies (a green-brown-red alliance), as in HolocaustAsfal al Safalin (“the lowest of the-modern history related to the status of the Jews as ‘protected,’ has- and space-dependent. It appears mostly among Muslim-Arab conflict:Ghatrasa (arrogance): The Jew as one who strayed from his historical humble-local variant that is not common throughout the Muslim-70.-Semitism have penetrated the core-dependent attitudes and beliefs, but now it increasingly invadesBlood Libel, did not become-Christian minority, such as Syria and Lebanon.-cultural setting affects the causes, contents and-Semitism. This is especially true in the Muslim diaspora,-Semitism has been flourishing for-skilled blue-war Western economies, which was-wave industrialization’ (such as automobiles, mechanics, chemicals,-wave industrialization,’ which is now based on-racial grounds. The outcome of the second-generation crisis-Arab conflict is added to the mix.-racial-ethnic riots (as in Brixton). Monitoring is by both governmental and-ethnic voluntary bodies.-economic strata, that cultural and-ethnic committees-continent,-and-let-live’ solutions.-expression, and their education allows-wingers, drawing a sense of power,-to-face encounters. A-Semitism and Holocaust denial could isolate the Muslims, so even Islamic-Semitic content are being-Semitic propaganda materials-Semitism and Holocaust denial a cornerstone of its ideology and rhetoric.-year-old Republican pattern, but due to the-citizen immigrants have no political clout-Europeans, because the-generational culture of institutionalized poverty.-Semitism, which in the last two decades has taken on an Islamic-generation-stricken tenements through education and-generation-Henri Lévy-Semitism without Jews,”-wife’s enigmatic new husband, tycoon Richard Attias).-Semitic incidents in general)-phobic acts). This accounts for theWesen in the Hegelian terms of classic Middle-doing (Zulm) is rooted-trodden lower classes. Ever since then, this-financial element may be secondary to the perception of the principles of-Mining analyses conducted on the educational materials publishedth century (see, for instance, Archie Brown,
Communism: Its Rise and Fall
42
been a sense of injustice on the one hand, and a lust for revenge on the other. The
injustice to which these revolts referred had usually been well
and quantifiable data; it was real, not an illusion.
The common denominator of Muslim Brotherhood movements in the UK and France
is that they have a vested practical interest, not just an ideological one, in rallying
their supporters for mass demonstrations against Israel when it is engaged in military
operations. In these demonstrations, an anti
latent or explicit (as in the case of Fuad Alawi, vice president of UOIF, who said during
Operation Cast Lead: “There can be no peace in the Middle East as long as the Zionist
project exists, because it is based on the negation of the existence of Palestine”). Such
demonstrations provide these movements with an opportunity to parade their power
and recruit members to their communitarian ideal, through the manipulation of rage
against the atrocities as seen on TV. Moreover, they allow the movements to expand
their cooperation with the left wing that favors the Third World, whose members
attend these demonstrations as well.
Frank Furedi, an astute British observer, argues that these Muslim demonstrations
are revitalizing anti
civil society. Both these radical extremes find in these demonstrations a cover and
justification for taking to the streets in the name of anti
racist anti
to their brethren in the Middle East, why not show our sympathy to them and our
hatred of their oppressors? In this way, even the right wing that is clearly hostile to
immigration in both countries can once again spread its anti
recent times has been confined to the realms of social unacceptability. Curtailing the
scope of Muslim anti
the traditional anti
CHAPTER 4:
RECOMMENDATION NO. 1:
“Know How to Pick Your Fight” Even if the required course of action is an offensive,
one should still choose wisely the arena for the fight, so as not to dilute power. The
connection between anti-Semitism and the War on Terror launched by President Bush
is by no means a simple equation. It is far better to concentrate on the anti-Semitism
whose vector is the Muslim Brotherhood and their ilk among Islamic radicals and
their extensions within the Sunni governmental establishment, as well as on two
specific regimes – the Iranian and the Saudi, who are prime purveyors of anti-Semitic
consciousness – and not on that of Al Qaeda.
The linkage with Holocaust denial (or minimization) has gained visibility in the brand
of banal anti-Semitism promoted by the Brotherhood and their allies (such as the
younger Ulama at al Azhar, Ahmadinejad and the Islamic Liberation Party) only in
recent times. This is not an inevitable outcome, but in a sense, it is a self-inflicted
wound by Muslim anti-Semitism – and it must be exploited, all the more so when
the Holocaust is being justified. The same is true for the opportunistic pact between
extremists such Tariq Ramadan with the anti-globalization left, and his animosity
towards liberal Jewish intellectuals (Alain Finkielkraut, André Glucksmann, Alexandre
Adler, etc.). Tariq Ramadan, who had recently been under attack for his views, has
indeed rescinded (in an interview to Le Point on June 4, 2009) some harshly anti-
Semitic utterances, modifying them into somewhat vaguer terms.
The Hamas phenomenon calls for special treatment (see Recommendation No. 2
below), but in general, there is a common basis for a counter-attack by the Jews and
their allies on a global scale. Nevertheless, due to the need for coordination, the main
action outside the Middle East (Europe, Australia), must be carried out within the
framework of each and every country, and according to its conditions. There is no
comprehensive formula of the one size-fits-all variety.
44
RECOMMENDATION NO. 2:
The main rival is the most intensive producer (although not the distributor) of Jew
hatred propaganda today, i.e. the Hamas movement and other branches of the
Muslim Brotherhood, whether in the Middle East or in Western Europe (UOIF, BMA,
etc.). In certain countries – Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser degree Egypt, Algeria and
Morocco – the penetration of Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology into the ruling and
cultural establishment is noticeable. These movements have turned the eradication of
Israel into a basic Islamic commandment, which is also perceived as fair retaliation for
the crimes of Judaism against Islam throughout history. (According to some of Hamas
theorists, the Holocaust was just the first installment of that historical payment).
This essentialist overlap, designed to instill a deterministic sense of inevitable victory,
creates a broad theologization of the Israeli-Arab conflict and its inherent Muslim
hostility, which, at least in Hamas, has moved even beyond the high threshold set
by revolutionary Iran and the puritanical Wahabi sentiment in Saudi Arabia, which is
extremely hostile to rival monotheistic religions. This is exacerbated by the fact that
Palestine is increasingly being perceived as the Holy Land, an inalienable religious
endowment (waqf) that can never be forfeited. While there have been previous
attempts at such theologization (for instance by al Azhar in 1968), the present scale
and intensity are unprecedented. Moreover, as a result of the two Intifadas, Hamas has
become a role model for Sunni movements the world over, and its suicide terrorists
have set an example. This is also true in non-religious pan-Arab circles, such as some
of the viewers of Al Jazeera or the followers of Egyptian Nasserite theorist Hassanein
Heikal, who are concentrated around the monthly Wijhat Nathar wa-Kutub. Tapes by
Hamas preachers or by suicidal terrorists on the eve of their attacks are widespread
throughout the world of Islam and its diaspora, carrying further the gospel of eternal
hatred of Jews and Judaism.
In this way, among others, the theme of Holocaust denial – which is, for the Palestinian
camp, an innovation introduced by Hamas – is being propagated throughout the
Sunni world. The idea of Holocaust justification first appeared in Nasserite Egypt, but
died out in the 1970s, only to be resurrected in the last decade by Hamas.
These themes enjoy a unique emotional hold on the minds of the three hundred
cadres of Hamas; according to the findings of a study conducted using the Collective
Biography method. Two thirds of these cadres are descendants of refugees, and
another two thirds (not necessarily the same ones) come from ulama families.
45
Likewise, 60% are villagers (a traditional sector). One could easily assume therefore
that such themes are an active, integral and viable factor.
Quite apart from the political struggle against Hamas, it should therefore also be
dealt with on a cultural-ideological level, as a well-poisoning movement impacting
Muslim lands. It should be denounced and condemned using documentation, and
isolated from liberal and leftist circles in the West which tend mistakenly to regard
it as moderate. Obviously, certain non-tactical and un-opportunistic manifestations
of forsaking the present attitude are possible at some point in the future even within
Hamas circles. We must keep alert and attentive to such a possibility. This entity may
not necessarily continue to exist forever; but it is likely to endure during the lifetimes
of the dominant cadres in Hamas, who are, as mentioned, refugees and refugees’
children, such a change is not foreseeable.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 3:
An informed and long-term offensive must be based on serious, systematic, nonanecdotal,
un-sensational and in particular non-essentialist information in contrast
to the approach promoted by Bat Yeor, (see references section) and her ilk. Only such
an offensive will have sufficient credibility and endurance. It must rely on systematic
monitoring of varied information sources (mostly written but also audio-visual), as
artfully done by MEMRI. A good example is the book by M. Litvak and E. Webman,
From Empathy to Denial , Columbia University Press, 2009, which addresses Holocaust
denial in the Arab world. Quantitative and computerized content analysis methods,
such as Opinion-Mining, should be introduced, allowing the examination and followup
of long-term trends and tracing and comparing the ebb and flow of certain themes
and different countries and movements.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 4:
It is doubtful whether dialogue with Islam has much value; there is substantial value
only in maintaining “dialogue between believers” (or dialogue between those who
observe the commandments of their faith), not between traditionalists or pretenders,
who are not really observant. A dialogue of believers, as the one maintained by
mystical sects (Sufis and Cabalists) benefits from their shared basis of belief. The same
46
is true for the dialogue between Halachic and Sharia scholars, mainly around sensitive
issues such as the status of women and the ‘other.’
A real dialogue may develop through the Yad VaShem Arab-language website which
opened in January 2008. The Persian-language version has already yielded thousands
of inquiries (a third of them from Iran), which deserve study and proper response.
Dialogue around common worries, leading to joint action, is best. As in the case
of rabbis and imams fighting against abortion in Canada, or Orthodox rabbis in
Switzerland supporting Muslim clerics in the fight against the ban on minarets, which
they take to be a blatant case of religious discrimination.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 5:
An effort must be made to eradicate stereotypes held by Jews about Muslims. This
has educational as well as PR value. An eradication of stereotypes about Muslims in
our camp would enable us to undertake an uncompromising fight against Muslim
anti-Semitism with ‘clean hands.’ In this fight, the phenomenon (which is often merely
opportunistic) of Holocaust denial by Jew haters must be exploited, because it is a
self-inflicted wound, and as the saying goes, “à la guerre comme à la guerre. ” This also
applies to the ludicrous and scary figure of a populist like Ahmadinejad, brandishing
a nuclear weapon. It is unclear whether he has a say on nuclear issues or whether his
utterances correctly express the motivation of the real decision makers (headed by
Khamenei).
Here we touch upon a somewhat paradoxical issue. “Therefore shall thy camp
be pure” is not only a commendable moral imperative, but also a useful rule of
engagement in an all-out war. It is extremely important to eradicate manifestations
of racism and cultural crassness in our midst; not only in order to be able to show
our ‘patte blanche’ to the global public opinion, but also in order to be able to fully
understand the danger of anti-Semitism in its actual and non-hyped proportions. It
is vital to understand the empirical socio-economic reality from which anti-Semitism
often stems. It is also important for Jews to support affirmative action for Muslim
minorities in the West, because in the intermediate and long run this could diminish
hostility towards the Jews. It is advisable to avoid hyped-up exaggerations of unverified
incidents (as in the case of mythomaniacs who fabricate anti-Semitic abuse).
This would save us the erosion of credibility in cases of real anti-Semitic incidents.
47
Moreover, we should develop empathy for the predicament of Muslims who are
stigmatized as a group. This would not only help to see reality as it is, where there is
no actual clash of civilizations, not even in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. It would also
serve as an educational and therapeutic means for Jewish activists on this issue. It is
in the name of such empathy that we can prepare for the difficult and long struggle
against the stereotype-laden and ideological Muslim anti-Semitism of the Muslim
Brotherhood variety.
A useful educational tool is TV comedy, such as the Sleeper Cell sitcom series in the US,
which deals with the suspicion that all American Muslims are actually “home-grown
terrorists.” The series centers on an African-American FBI agent infiltrating a sleeper
cell headed by a Muslim extremist. The Muslim environment in which he operates
is normal and American. In the same vein, an episode of The Simpsons (produced
by Fox) depicts a Muslim named Bashir who suffers discrimination and prejudice in
the small town inhabited by the protagonists, to which he recently moved. Homer
Simpson groundlessly suspects Bashir of involvement in a terrorist plot, but his son
Bart protects Bashir against his persecutors and publicly proves his innocence.
An even better example is the Canadian sitcom Little Mosque on the Prairie, which
revolves around the diverse world of a mosque in a rural area in Canada. This series
has also been syndicated in France, Finland and Turkey, and is marked by a humanistic
and empathic characterization. In cinema, the films by (Tunisian born) French
director Abdelatif Kechiche are remarkable in their empathetic ability: La Faute à
Voltaire (2001), L’Esquive (2003) and Le Grain et le Mulet (2007) candidly describe the
lives of North-African immigrants. An even more sensitive issue, that of groundless
charges of anti-Semitism by mythomaniacs, is approached in the film La Fille du RER
(Andre Techine, 2009), which is based on a true story. The predicament of clandestine
immigrants is well treated by the Algerian-born filmmaker Merzak Allouache, in
Harragas (2009). It is important that Jewish activists who are engaged in the struggle
against anti-Semitism watch and study such series and films.
48
***
On a personal note I would add, that the most alarming finding does not concern the
specific contents of Muslim anti-Semitism, but the banalization of anti-Jewish images
among Muslim youth in Europe (and possibly in Australia). F. Khosrokhavar and
D. Joly, who studied Muslim youth in the UK and France through in-depth interviews
and focus-groups conducted in 2004-5, sought to grasp the conceptual world of their
respondents. The issue of their attitude toward Jews was expected by these scholars to
be raised. To their surprise, they found a near-obsession with the Jews (not necessarily
with Israel), who were blamed as the main reason for the plight of Pakistani and
Maghrebi immigrants in these countries, across a range of different problems, such
as the shortage of social workers and quality housing in poverty-stricken suburbs, the
income disparity (“the Rothschilds steal everything”), and so on.
The conclusion is that in Western countries (including Australia), the main target for
the fight against anti-Semitism must be the majority society, and especially the opinion
shapers, who must be persuaded of the need to make it clear that anti-Semitism and
its concomitant themes (such as Holocaust denial) are strictly out-of-bounds for any
civilized human being.
An educational and public media effort is as important as, if not more important
than, any legislative prohibitions.
GLOSSARY
Ahl al-Dhimma “Protected Peoples” = the status of non-Muslims,
who are not pagans, in the lands of the caliphate.
Asfal al-Safilin Lowest of the low
Awlad al-Mawt Children of death
Dar al-Islam Abode of Islam, the world of Islam
Da’wa Propaganda of social-educational activity of radical Islam
Dhimmi See Ahl al-Dihmma
Fatwa Religious ruling
Ghatrasa Arrogance
Hadith Canonical traditions about the prophet and his
companions
Harki Muslim militias aiding the French army during the
Algerian war
Hijra Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina (622)
Hizb al-Tahrir Islamic liberation party
Isra’iliyyat Muslim traditions about Jews
Jama’a Association
Jam’iyat ulama al-Azhar The young guard of al-Azhar clerics
Jizya Capitation tax levied on non-Muslims
Mahdi The Muslim messiah
Mu’minum Believers
Mut’a Temporary marriage (in the Shia)
Najasa Impurity
Nakba The catastrophe = the Arabs dub the 1948 defeat
Qawmiyya Pan-Arab nationalism
Sufi Muslim mystic
Sham Syria in the Muslim era (comprising also present day
Jordan, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine
Shari’a Islamic Law
Ulama Muslim clerics
Waqf Religion endowment
Wataniyya Nation-state nationalism
Wujaha Notables
REFERENCES:
1. Bat Ye’or, Islam and Dhimmitude, 2001
2. Bat Ye'or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis, 2005
3. M. R. Cohen, Under Crescent and Cross, 1994
4. F. Furedi, “What is Behind 21st Century Anti-Semitism”, Spiked, Jan. 19, 2009
5. F. Khosrokhavar & D. Joly, Moslems in Prison in Britain and France, 2006
6. D. Joly, L’Émeute, Paris 2007
7. L. Klausen, The Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe, 2008
8. M. Litvak & E. Webman, From Empathy to Denial, Columbia UP 2009
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www.jpppi.org.ilRECOMMENDATIONS, 2009), which found that their common motivation had-corroborated, in clear-Semitic tone is discernable, whether-Semitism within the British radical left and radical right wings in-Zionism (from the left) and-Semitism (from the right). If the Muslims are angry at what is being done-Semitism, which in-Semitism in Western Europe could therefore also curb some of-Semitism, left and right.-professional group overwhelmingly in favor of suchBETWEEN

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